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The Legality of Backhaul Allowances
Under The Robinson-Patman Act:
An Analysis
I. Introduction
A serious question exists regarding the legality of backhaul al-
lowances, price concessions granted to customers who transport and
deliver their own goods. The dilemma was articulated in 1967'
when a seller requested a Federal Trade Commission Advisory
Opinion. The Commission indicated that backhaul allowances cre-
ated a probable violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act2 because of potential price discrimination. Accordingly, the
FTC position has severely curtailed the practice of backhauling.
3
The decrease in backhauling is economically undesirable be-
cause it results in the waste of thousands of gallons of fuel annually.4
This waste increases gas prices and exacerbates shortages by main-
taining demand at a higher than necessary level. Furthermore,
prices on a multitude of other goods are driven upward because of
the increased fuel costs, adding to the inflationary pressures on the
United States economy.' In light of the rapid escalation of fuel
prices, 6 as well as the nation's recent renewed commitment to energy
conservation, 7 backhauling should be explicitly authorized and en-
couraged by the FTC.
This comment analyzes the legality of backhaul allowances
under the Robinson-Patman Act. A discussion of the FTC Advisory
1. FTC Advisory Opinion 147, 16 C.F.R. § 15.147 (1980). (Originally published in 32
Fed. Reg. 14694 (1967)). See notes 9-21 and accompanying text infra.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The Robinson-Patman Act amended the price discrimina-
tion provisions of Section 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1914)
(amended 1936). Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act attempts to eliminate direct or
indirect price discrimination when specified competitive injury might result. Section 2(a) was
also intended to eradicate monopoly, see note 89 infra, and increase economic efficiency, see
note 94 infra.
3. Butler, Federal Trade Agency's Backhaul Policy Put Down by Ford's Wage-Price
Council, Traffic World, Apr. 14, 1975, at 29.
4. PRIVATE LINE, June, 1978, at 1.4.
5. Parker, What the Oil Crunch Has Done to the Outlook, FORTUNE, July 30, 1979, at 9.
6. Since April, 1979, fuel prices have risen at an annual rate of 78 percent. Franklin,
Business Outlook, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 24, 1979, at 29.
7. Address by President Carter to the nation (July 15, 1979), as reprinted in the New
York Times, July 16, 1978, at 12, col. 1.
Opinion' is presented, along with an overview of the treatment of
price discrimination under the act. In addition, the comment ana-
lyzes the weaknesses of the FTC viewpoint and discusses the policy
reasons supporting backhaul allowances.
II. Background of the Backhaul Allowance Issue
A. Federal Trade Commission Policy Against Backhaul Allowances."
Advisory Opinion 147
The chief factor in discouraging backhauling has been the Fed-
eral Trade Commission policy that price allowances to backhauling
buyers violates the Robinson-Patman Act. The FTC articulated this
position in 1967 when it issued Advisory Opinion 147.9 The ques-
tion arose when a manufacturer of food products sought an opin-
ion"0 regarding the legality of offering a discount from its uniform
delivered price. " The manufacturer sold all its products on a typical
delivered price basis. The invoice amount included delivery to the
customer and incorporated a flat rate identical for all purchasers re-
gardless of their proximity to the shipping manufacturer. Because
certain customers had trucks returning unfilled along routes near the
seller's warehouses, they requested a price allowance for using their
unfilled trucking capacity to transport their purchases. The manu-
facturer requested an advisory opinion from the FTC on the legality
of granting an allowance to the backhauling customers equal to the
actual common carrier freight rate that the seller would otherwise
incur. 12
The Commission analyzed the proposal in light of Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 3 Section 2(a) provides that it is un-
8. 16 C.F.R. § 15.147 (1980). Backhaul allowances were initially called into question by
Opinion 147. The Federal Trade Commission is authorized by F.T.C.R. PRAc. 1.1 to issue
advisory opinions at the request of any person, partnership, or corporation regarding its view
of the legality of a proposed course of action. These opinions do not have the force and effect
of law, but indicate whether the FTC would prosecute if the proposed action were taken.
9. 16 C.F.R. § 15.147 (1980). The FTC has twice reiterated its position on backhaul
allowances since issuing Advisory Opinion 147 in 1967. See FTC Press Release (Mar. 28,
1975); FTC Press Release (Dec. 26, 1973).
10. See note 8 supra.
i1. A uniform delivered price includes cost of the item and cost of delivery and is identi-
cal to all buyers regardless of their geographic location. The price includes delivery of the
goods to the buyer's plant.
12. For instance, assume that a backhauling customer saved the seller a $10 charge for
the delivery of an item with a uniform price of $ 100. The seller then would deduct this savings
from the uniform price, and charge the backhauling buyer $90 for the goods. The price allow-
ance reflects the seller's savings arising from the buyer's performance of the transportation
function.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Section 2(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities
are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory
lawful for a seller to discriminate in the price charged different buy-
ers of "commodities of like grade and quality"' 4 when the effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent
competition,"' 5 and when no defense afforded by the Act is applica-
ble.' 6 The Commission advised that, assuming the presence of all
the other elements of a prima facie violation of the statute,' 7 the
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants




16. The Robinson-Patman Act provides three affirmative defenses to a charge of price
discrimination: the good faith meeting of a competitor's equally low price; cost justification of
price differentials; and price differentials in response to changing market conditions. The
"meeting competition" defense applies only to meeting a competitor's prices in individual
competitive situations and not as part of any pricing system. It may not be used in defense of
an entire pricing system, although it is a valid defense for charges of discrimination in individ-
ual transactions. The defense does not apply when the seller undercuts, rather than meets, his
competitor's price. To sustain his burden of proof, the seller must "show the existence of facts
which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price
would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor." FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945).
The cost justification defense may be used when the price discrimination arises from dif-
ferences in the seller's cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from different methods
or quantities in which the goods are sold. The defense, therefore, permits justification of price
differentials based upon cost economies of serving different customers. The price differential
granted, however, may not exceed the seller's actual cost savings. See Section III infra.
The "changing market conditions" defense permits a seller to alter his prices in response
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the particular goods.
The defense applies to price allowances for changes in the goods themselves, e.g., actual or
imminent deterioration of the goods or obsolescence of seasonal goods, and changes in the
conditions of the market, e.g., a distress sale under court process or sales in good faith discon-
tinuance of business in the goods concerned. For an excellent discussion of all three defenses,
see F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 207-329 (1962).
17. To establish a prima facie case of price discrimination under Section 2(a) five re-
quirements must be met. First, the seller charged must be engaged in interstate commerce, and
the transactions in question must have occurred in the course of that commerce. If the sales
were wholly intrastate, the Act does not apply. See, e.g., Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390
F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953
(7th Cir. 1964); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963); Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co.,
287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
Second, the discriminatory transactions must involve commodities. Thus, the Robinson-
Patman Act does not apply to discrimination in the following instances: sales of mutual fund
shares, Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969); sale of a news
report service to radio broadcast stations, Tri-State Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United Press Int'l,
Inc., 369 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1966); sale of television time, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Amana Refrig., Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962); construc-
tion contracts, General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943); exclusive licensing agreements, Record Club of America, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1970); fees for license rights
to a patented process, La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F.
Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1968); leases of real estate, Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle
Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, 219 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
Third, the commodities that are the subject of the price differential must be of like grade
and quality. For example, a price difference between identical physical products bearing dif-
manufacturer's proposal would "probably result in a violation of the
law."' 18 This conclusion necessarily flows from the FTC's interpreta-
tion of a delivered pricing system. In a delivered pricing system the
freight factor included in the price is not the actual freight to any
given point, but an average of the freight costs for all buyers within
the zone where the delivered price is quoted. Thus, this figure is
determined by a formula apart from actual costs. Consequently, if
one customer is given a backhaul allowance for the actual freight
costs saved by the seller, the Commission concluded that a "serious
possibility of discrimination would exist."' 9
Although the Opinion is not a legally binding interpretation,20 it
has created the presumption that use of the allowances may result in
prosecution by the FTC. Accordingly, Opinion 147 has effectively
eliminated the granting of backhaul allowances from uniform
prices2 ' thereby removing the buyer's incentive to backhaul.
ferent labels and brand names violates the Act. Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage
Corp. & America Distilling Co., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962). If substantial physical differ-
ences in the products exist which affect consumer preference or marketability, however, they
are not of like grade and quality regardless of whether the raw materials used, manufacturing
operations, and manufacturing costs are the same. Universal Rundle Corp., 65 F.T.C. 924
(1964), order set aside on other grounds, 382 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1967); Quaker Oats Co., 66
F.T.C. 1131 (1964).
Fourth, two actual and completed purchases by different purchasers must be shown.
Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939). A "purchaser" means a present
purchaser, rather than a past or prospective one. Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 218
F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954); Chicago Seating Co. v. Karpen & Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir.
1949). Also, the sales must be substantially or reasonably contemporaneous ip time to invoke
the Act. Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947). The sales, however, need not be made at exactly the
same time. Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp. & American Distilling Co., 307
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962). The Act also requires that the sales giving rise to the alleged discrim-
ination be made "within the United States or any territory thereof, or in the District of Colum-
bia or in any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States." 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
Last, the Act requires a showing that the effect of the price differential is to substantially
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion. Actual harm is not required, but rather only the possibility of competitive injury must be
established. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). The potential effect on competition
must nevertheless be substantial. International Film Center, Inc. v. Gralex, Inc., 427 F.2d 334
(3d Cir. 1970); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325
F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 954 (1964). The burden of proof on the issue of
competitive effect is on the FTC, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961);
General Foods Corp., 50 FTC 885 (1954); or on the plaintiff, if the suit is a private one, Atlas
Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 843 (1960); Elgin Corp. v. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co., 251 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 926 (1958). With respect to competitive injury, see generally, C. EDWARDS,
THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 518-45 (1959); F. ROWE, supra note 16, at 113-206.
18. 16 C.F.R. § 15.147 (1967).
19. Id
20. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 47 (1967).
21. See note 3 supra. The FTC position has raised nationwide dissent. See, e.g.,
Borghesani, Private Carriage, Delivered Prices, FTC Opinions And Allowances/or Customer
Pickup Observed, PRIVATE CARRIER, Oct. 1974, at 1; Butler, supra note 3. A bill has been
introduced in Congress that would permit backhaul allowances. The Diesel Fuel and Conser-
vation Act of 1977 would amend § 382 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.
6201 (1976), by adding the following paragraph:
B. Price Discrimination in the Robinson-Patman Act - Section
2(a)
Section 2(a) was designed to prevent price discrimination be-
tween similarly situated buyers.22  "Discrimination" under Section
2(a) means merely a difference in net 23 price. 4 Although a competi-
tive relationship among purchasers is not a prerequisite to a finding
of price discrimination,25 the possibility that the discrimination will
tend to create a monopoly or will be deleterious to competition must
be shown.26 Accordingly, granting a price reduction to a backhaul-
ing customer, while charging the full delivered price for similar
goods to another customer, results in Section 2(a) price discrimina-
tion.
Section 2(a), however, provides an affirmative defense of cost
justification to a charge of price discrimination.27 This proviso per-
mits a seller to vary prices between buyers if actual differences in the
costs of serving them exist. The FTC failed to account for the possi-
bility of this defense in Advisory Opinion 147.
It shall not be unlawful for a seller of goods, wares or merchandise pursuant to a
uniform zone delivered pricing system to grant backhaul allowances to a buyer where
the backhaul function is actually performed by the buyer or an authorized carrier
serving the buyer, where the allowance is no greater than the actual savings in deliv-
ery costs to the seller and where the allowances are available to all the seller's cus-
tomers on a non-discriminatory basis.
S. 1699, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). In addition to reflecting public sentiment, this nationwide
dissent indicates that the accuracy of the FTC view that backhaul allowances contravene the
Robinson-Patman Act is questionable. The Commission's admission in Opinion 147 that the
conclusion "may seem unreasonable" indicates its own uncertainty regarding the disallowance
of price concessions.
22. See EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 21-53 (legislative history of the Robinson-Patman
Act).
23. The prices compared in determining whether a difference exists are "net" prices, i.e.,
the invoice amount less all discounts, rebates, and allowances. See, e.g., Corn Products Ref.
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 737 (1945). According to the report of the Advisory Committee
appointed to study the cost justification defense of § 2(a), reality is the prime consideration not
form, The price used in determining whether discrimination exists, the Committee stated,
must be "net of all applicable allowances, discounts and rebates which the buyer receives or is
entitled to receive." Advisory Committee on Cost Justification, Report To The Federal Trade
Commission 9 (FTC Mimeo., 1956). Thus, if a purchaser is billed and pays $10 at the date of
sale, but is subsequently given a rebate of $1 upon the performance of some specified act or the
attainment of a specified volume of purchases, the price is reduced to $9.
24. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
25. Id
26. For a discussion of the degree of competitive injury that must be shown, see H.
SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE 24-41 (1977). See also Austern, Pre-
sumption and Percivience About Competitive Effect.- An Evaluation, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
22 (1968); Rowe, Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. New Dimensions In The Competitive
Injury Concept, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 14 (1968).
27. The statutory language of § 2(a) provides: "[N]othing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods by which such commodities are to such purchas-
ers sold or delivered." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
III. Availability of Cost Justification Defense of Section 2(a) to
Justify Granting of Backhaul Allowances
Examination of the cost justification deferral of Section 2(a)
reveals that it applies to the price discrimination between backhaul-
ing and nonbackhauling buyers. The defense clearly encompasses
the granting of backhaul allowances since transportation by the pur-
chaser, as opposed to delivery by the seller, is a "differing method"28
of delivery through which the seller realizes tangible savings in
freight costs. Price differentials that make "only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery" 29 resulting
from different methods or quantities in which goods are sold or de-
livered to different customers are permissible. The FTC, however, in
Opinion 147, disposes of this defense by stating that its availability is
"highly doubtful."3 This statement is contrary to the Commission's
prior decisions3 and the express purpose of Congress 32 in creating
the defense, which indicate that backhaul allowances are cost-justifi-
able.
A. Cost-Justfication - A Defense to Discriminations Arising from
Backhaul Allowances
The legislative history of Section 2(a) indicates congressional in-
tent to allow price differentials that reflect varying delivery costs to
buyers.33 Interpreting the cost justification provision, Congressman
Hubert Utterback 34 noted that a seller may give price reductions in
favor of those particular customers whose "distinctive methods of
purchase and delivery"35 make possible economies in distribution.
Furthermore, Section 2(a) permits the translation of differences in
cost into price differentials to the customers concerned, "no matter
where those differences arise."' 36 Accordingly, the cost justification
defense should be applicable to backhaul allowances, since these al-
lowances reflect the seller's distribution savings arising from the
backhauling customer's performance of the delivery function.
B. Prior FTC Rulings Recognizing a Cost Justification Defense
Prior FTC decisions authorizes a price differential when differ-
28. Id
29. Id
30. 16 C.F.R. § 15.147 (1967).
31. See Section IIIB, infra.
32. See Section IliA, infra.
33. For a general discussion of the history of the act, see EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 21-
53.
34. Congressman Utterback was chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee that
conducted hearings on the Patman Bill.
35. 80 CONG. REC. 9417 (1936).
36. Id (emphasis added).
ing delivery methods result in a cost savings. For example, in Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp.,37 the respondent was charged with violating
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act for granting discounts to
purchasers who bought loaf cheese in quantities greater than 150
pounds.38 These buyers received delivery directly from the Kraft
warehouse at a cost of seven and one-half cents per pound, or rough-
ly three-tenths of one percent of sales price. Buyers of less than 150
pounds, however, received delivery from the Kraft delivery truck
39
at an average cost of three dollars and seventy-seven cents per
pound,' about fourteen percent of the sales price. The Commission
found that the more expensive mode of delivery justified the higher
price to purchasers in quantities of less than 150 pounds. The Com-
mission expressed no doubt that the delivery costs were a proper
subject of the cost justification defense.4
In Ideal Cement Company,4 2 purchasers who transported their
cement from respondent's cement plants by motor carrier were
charged twenty cents per barrel more than those transporting cement
of identical grade and quality from the same plants by rail freight.
Ideal asserted that the additional cost delivery to motor carriers justi-
fied the price variance. The defense failed because Ideal was not
able to carry its burden of proving cost justification.43 The FTC,
therefore, prohibited Ideal from further use of this pricing practice.
The cease and desist order, however, recognized the future validity
of the pricing practice upon presentation of sufficient proof of the
claimed difference in costs." The Commission thus acknowledged
37. 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
38. The quantity discount granted by Kraft was also challenged. Retail buyers of more
than $5 of package cheese and salad products over a two to three week period, as well as billed
group buyers of over $100, received a 5% discount. This discount was upheld because the FTC
determined that it did not inflict any injury to competition. Id. at 544-45.
39. Kraft used a delivery system that was designed to insure the freshness of the products
when delivered, to facilitate the return of products that were not fresh, and to stimulate the
retailers interest in its products. It was this system, as well as the small quantities involved in
each delivery, that made these deliveries so expensive. Id. at 544.
40. This average was for the delivery of all products by the delivery truck. The FTC
found that although an argument could be made that the delivery of one particular item was
less expensive than the average, any reasonable allocation of cost would unquestionably leave
a differential large enough to support the difference in price. In the Commission's view, the
practical impossibility of making an accurate allocation of cost to each kind and amount of
product delivered from the truck was no ground for ignoring the "reasonable inference" that
the differential was cost-justified. Id at 546.
41. The FTC has explicitly agreed. See Southern Cal. Jobbers, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6889,
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 17,410 (1965). In that case, the Commission stated that in deter-
mining the manufacturer's costs, the appropriate areas for consideration are among others,
sales expense (such as compensation for sales personnel), freight and delivery costs, the expense
of publishing and distributing catalogs and price lists, and billing and credit expenses.
42. 47 F.T.C. 1030 (1951). See also Monolith Portland Cement Co., 47 F.T.C. 1292
(1951) (companion case with identical fact situation and ruling by FTC).
43. The burden of proof of cost justification is on the seller because it is an affirmative
defense. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
44. The provision read,
that a customer's receipt of goods at the seller's plant is a "method of
delivery" within the meaning of Section 2(a).
The Kraft-Phenix and Ideal rulings illustrate the appropriate-
ness of the cost justification defense for price differentials between
either two buyers who take door delivery or between two buyers who
receive their goods at the seller's plant. A logical extension of this
reasoning reveals that a variance in price between two buyers, one
who accepts full delivery45 and the other who transports his own
goods, should be cost-justified. The federal courts actually reached
this conclusion in a private antitrust action,46 Morton v. National
Dairy Products Corporation.47 Defendant, National Dairy, sold milk
at a "platform" price from its plant in Camden, New Jersey, to
Pennsylvania buyers at prices less than it charged on into-the-store
Sales in Pennsylvania. Customers who bought at the platform used
their own trucks to transport the milk to Pennsylvania. The evidence
indicated that the cost of serving customers at the platform was
twenty-six percent less than that of making full delivery. The court
found that this savings justified the twenty-two percent difference in
price.48
Although Morton was a unique market situation,49 it is impor-
tant because of the judicial recognition that differences in store-door
delivery and factory pick-up prices are not outside the scope of Sec-
tion 2(a). The FTC, in summarily dismissing this defense, has ig-
Provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to prevent the re-
spondent from defending any alleged violation of this order by showing that any
differences in price make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which said
product is to such purchasers sold or delivered.
47 F.T.C. at 1038.
45. "Full delivery" means delivery by the seller to the buyer's plant or warehouse; the
delivery function is performed by the seller, rather than the buyer.
46. Private antitrust actions for treble damages are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4(a), added in 1955, authorizes the United States to institute
single damage suits for injuries to the government's business or property through antitrust
violations. The three essential elements to a private action are a violation of the antitrust laws,
injury to the plaintiff's business or property, and measurable damage. Hudson Sales Corp. v.
Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Kinnear-Weed
Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912
(1954).
47. 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968), af'd, 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1006 (1970).
48. No requirement exists that a price reduction reflect the full amount of the seller's cost
savings. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Robinson-Patman Act stated, "The
bill neither requires nor compels the granting of discrimination or differentials of any
sort. . . . It does not require the differential, if granted, to be the arithmetical equivalent of the
difference. It is sufficient that it does not exceed it." S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1936).
49. The market was unique because milk prices were regulated by both Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, and the New Jersey price floor was lower than Pennsylvania's. The court
nevertheless found that "[defendant's] cost justification adequately demonstrated the true
economies of selling its milk in large bulk quantities at the Camden platform." 287 F. Supp. at
763.
nored its own policy as well as the intent of the authors of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Notwithstanding the FTC's indication, a
discrimination in price between backhauling and nonbackhauling
buyers is squarely within the purview of the cost justification de-
fense. °
IV. Possible Discrimination From the Unavailability of Backhaul
Allowance to Some Buyers
In addition to the discrimination between buyers who elect to
backhaul and those that do not, the FTC was concerned that only a
relatively small number of buyers would be able to take advantage
of a backhaul allowance.5 ' Accordingly, discrimination would then
exist against the majority of buyers. 2
No price discrimination arises, however, if the same concessions
are accessible to all customers, even though some do not choose to
take advantage of them. 3 Nevertheless, theoretical price allowances
that are not practically available to all purchasers have been consist-
ently struck down as violative of Section 2(a).54 Evidence indi-
50. The preparation of a cost justification study from the seller's records often poses dif-
ficult financial and accounting problems. In one writer's opinion the defense is available "only
to the wealthy, the resourceful, and the tireless." Austern, Tabula in Naufragio Administrative
Style, Some Observations on the Robinson-Patman Act, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN SYMPOSIUM
105, 115 (1953). For an analysis of criticisms of the defense, see Murray, Cost-Jusfication
Under The Robinson-Patman Act: Impossibility Revisited, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 227. The FTC,
however, has indicated that a seller's cost study made in good faith and in accordance with
standard accounting principles will be given "very great weight." Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948). For information regarding the practicalities of pre-
paring a cost defense study, see Taylor, Cost Accounting Under The Robinson-Patman Act, 3
ANTITRUST BULL. 188 (1958); Van Cise, The Robinson-Patman Act and the Accountant, 3 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 325 (1958). For an example of a successful cost study, see Morton v. National
Dairy Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968), affid, 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970).
Only actual costs are considered in justifying a price differential. The FTC has rejected
claimed cost items such as investment costs, Borden Co., 62 F.T.C. 130 (1963), and return on
investment, Thompson Prods., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1252 (1959). Also, differentials may not be justi-
fied on the basis of unequal distribution of overhead costs. The House Judiciary Committee
Report of the Robinson-Patman Act reveals that all buyers must bear their aliquot share of
overhead. The price differential must be based on actual cost savings attributable to the busi-
ness of the particular customer receiving the allowance. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1936).
51. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 198, 16 C.F.R. § 15.198 (1968), in which the Commission
rejected a proposed quantity discount on the grounds that it would discriminate "between
customers qualifying for the discount and competing customers not able to qualify for it." Id
at 172. (The Commission also rejected the proposed quantity discount for lack of apparent
cost justification).
52. Section 2(a) applies to indirect as well as direct discrimination. Corn Products Ref.
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Forster Mfg., Inc. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964).
53. The seller is only required to make the price concession available to all buyers on a
nondiscriminatory basis. A buyer cannot render a seller's allowance discriminatory merely by
refusing to take advantage of it.
54. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (standard quantity discounts
not functionally available to all buyers held discriminatory); Viviano Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C.
313 (1968), afld, 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1969) (giving free goods to a supermarket chain on an
introductory basis held discriminatory because not available to established customers compet-
ing with the chain); Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120 (1962), affd, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
cates," however, that backhaul allowances and the corresponding
benefits would not be limited in availability.
Two potential bars exist to a purchaser's ability to take advan-
tage of a backhaul allowance. First, the allowance is only given to
buyers who accept delivery at the seller's plant. Thus, many small
retailers who do not maintain truck fleets would not be able to re-
ceive the allowance directly. Nevertheless, these buyers would still
receive the benefits of an allowance.56 A study by the Cost of Living
Council indicates that the fear that elimination of the backhaul re-
strictions would discriminate against certain retailers is not justified
in the food industry.57 Small retailers who could not directly avail
themselves of the allowance would still benefit because the
backhauling wholesalers would be induced to pass on the cost sav-
ings.
5 8
Second, the ability of buyers to avail themselves of the allow-
ance also depends upon the location of their shipping routes in rela-
tion to the seller's plant. Obviously, not all customers of a particular
seller will conveniently be able to backhaul. Nothing inherent in the
seller's pricing policy, however, prevents them from doing so. Fur-
ther, the savings from backhauling will be evenly distributed because
retailers will have many sources of supply at different locations. In
different instances, all will be able to take advantage of the cost sav-
ings generated from backhauling.59 The evidentiary findings6" by
denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964) (10% functional discount granted to jobbers who maintained an
inventory but not made available to regular jobbers was discriminatory because no objective
standards existed to guide in qualifying for the discount; decisions to grant the discount were
based on a concern to protect established jobbers); American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc.,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), modofed, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951) (annual volume discounts
for which only 2% of defendant's customers could qualify were discriminatory); Black Mfg.
Co., 54 F.T.C. 1196 (1958) (advertising allowances granted only on the basis of negotiations
and not made available on proportionally equal terms to all customers found discriminatory);
American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169 (1939) ("big dealer" discounts based solely on the buyer's
dollar volume during the discount period, regardless of the size or number of separate orders
handled, held discriminatory).
55. See notes 56-60 infra.
56. Letter of Apr. 6, 1973 from John T. Dunlop, Director of the Cost of Living Council,
to Hon. Lewis A. Engman, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (on file with Dickin-
son Law Review).
57. Id The conclusion of the study was that the benefits of backhaul allowances are
nondiscriminatory by size.
58. See note 60 infra.
59. Id.
60. See also Draft of a study by the National-American Wholesale Grocer's Assn. exam-
ining the impact of a significant increase in availability of backhaul/customer pickup privi-
leges on the competitive position of small independent retailers and small wholesalers
(contained in letter of Feb. 28, 1973 from Gerald E. Peck, Executive Vice President of Na-
tional-American Wholesale Grocer's Assn., to Morris Lewis, Jr. (on file with Dickinson Law
Review)). The study found that all stores of all sizes in the food industry are served by a
distribution center, all independent stores are served by a wholesaler, and, practically all
wholesalers can utilize backhaul privileges. The small independent retailers benefit from
backhaul through lower wholesaler fees. The wholesalers are under pressure to reflect
backhaul savings in lower fees because of the internal competition between wholesalers. Also,
the Cost of Living Council rebut the Commission's presumption that
backhaul allowances, in all instances, will be discriminatory because
of limited availability.6' Absent proof that this type of discrimina-
tion will occur in a specific case, a seller should not be denied the
ability to grant backhaul allowances.
V. Backhaul Discrimination is Analogous to the Discrimination
Inherent in Uniform Delivered Prices
In addition to the possibilities of discrimination arising from
different prices to backhauling versus nonbackhauling buyers and
discrimination because of unavailability of the allowance to some
buyers, a third discriminatory aspect of backhaul allowances exists.
This discrimination occurs when two purchasers both accept delivery
at the seller's warehouse and receive the backhaul allowance. Under
a uniform delivered pricing system an average freight rate is charged
all buyers, while the backhaul allowances are for the actual62 ship-
ping costs saved. The allowances will be unequal unless both buyers
are located exactly the same freight-cost63 distance from the seller's
plant. In all other cases prices to purchasers who provide their own
transportation will vary since nonuniform costs will be deducted
from uniform prices. Discrimination occurs because each buyer will
be paying different prices for identical goods.' The cost justification
defense is not available because between backhauling buyers the
economies of scale encourage wholesalers to pass on backhaul savings to increase their number
of customers.
With regards to backhaul availability arising from proximity to the seller, the study dis-
closed that generally, competing stores in a given shopping area are supplied by distribution
centers from a common marketing area. For all these stores, therefore, the benefit from
backhauling is equitable since all distribution centers have access to backhaul benefits.
In cases in which competing chain and/or independent stores are serviced by distribution
centers from different market areas, equalization factors exist:
It boils down to the fact that distribution centers, chain or wholesale, must keep
stores they service competitive in the store's shopping area. . . . Quite obviously
there are circumstances where prime highway routes and manufacturer shipping
points concentrations. . . could combine to disadvantage one distribution center rel-
ative to one of its competitors . . . this is the exception. . . . Ultimately, because of
the forces of competition the benefits of backhaul will pass through to retail stores.
Id. at 8-9.
61. The finding that the benefits of backhaul allowances will be available to most buyers
in the food industry cannot summarily be assumed true for all other markets. The findings
prove, that in at least some instances discrimination of this type will not take place. The FTC,
therefore, cannot justify a universal prohibition against backhaul allowances based on this
type of discrimination.
62. See note 50 supra.
63. Freight rates do not vary directly with distance. Thus, delivery costs may be the same
to buyers located varying distances from the seller's shipping point.
64. An illustration of this discrimination is as follows: assume a Pittsburgh seller has
customers in Los Angeles and Philadelphia, both of whom accept delivery of their goods at the
Pittsburgh plant. Seller's actual freight costs to the two buyers are $10 and $2, respectively.
The delivered price is $100. If both backhauling buyers receive a price reduction equal to
actual freight expenses, the price to the Los Angeles buyer will be $90 while the price to the
Philadelphia buyer will be $98. The result is clearly discriminatory, assuming the only rele-
vant difference between the two buyers is their location. A seller will have as many variations
65method of sale and delivery to each is the same.
Standing alone, a pricing practice producing this result violates
Section 2(a). Discrimination of this nature, however, is inherently
sanctioned under various uniform delivered pricing systems. Yet
these pricing systems have been repeatedly approved by both the
FTC and the courts66 thereby rendering a seller's price, if uniform to
all buyers, unassailable even if discriminatory.67
The Commission's refusal to endorse the discrimination inher-
ent in a system of backhaul allowances is irreconcilable with its ac-
quiescence to the discrimination of uniform prices. It cannot
disallow a system of backhaul allowances without contradicting the
time-honored view upholding the legality of delivered prices.
A few examples will illustrate the similarity between discrimina-
tion caused by backhaul allowances and uniform delivered prices.
In Chain Institute, Incorporated,6 a the FTC upheld three different
pricing schemes, each of which placed some buyers at a distinct dis-
advantage. Respondents were a trade institute and its eighteen
member companies that manufactured, sold, and distributed sub-
stantially all the welded chain, weldless chain, and tire chain pro-
duced in the United States. The complaint charged each of the
institute's members with violating Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act 69 by using single basing-point,7 ° freight equalization,7" uni-
in prices as he has in his freight costs. Potentially, no two buyers will pay the same price for
goods of like grade and quality when accepted at the seller's plant.
65. To be cost ustifiable, the Robinson-Patman Act requires that the price differential be
one "resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are sold or
delivered." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
66. In early interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act the FTC and the courts applied
a "mill net" concept to determine whether a price system was discriminatory. In applying this
concept, actual freight costs were deducted from the uniform delivered price charged to estab-
lish the comparability of all prices "at the mill." If buyers were located at different distances
from the seller's plant, prices compared on the basis of net return to the seller (i.e., deducting
transportation costs) were discriminatory. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726
(1945). The mill net theory was rejected in National Lead Co., 49 FTC 791 (1953), affd 227
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 352 U.S. 419 (1957) (proceedings on review entirely consistent
with abandonment of mill net theory), which upheld a zone delivered pricing system. See
notes 81-86 and accompanying text infra.
67. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D.
Del.), af'd, 327 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
68. 49 F.T.C. 1041 (1953), order sustainedon appeal, 246 F.2d 231 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
355 U.S. 895 (1957).
69. The complaint had two counts. The first count charged respondents with conspiring
to fix prices and restrain trade in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
Act prohibits the use of "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce," as well as "contracts or agreements providing for the establish-
ment or maintenance of minimum stipulated resale prices" between manufacturers, whole-
salers, brokers, factors, retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with
each other. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The FTC inferred conspiracy from the "substantial uni-
formity and virtual identity" of the Institute member's prices and issued a cease and desist
order to prevent the manufacturers from using delivered prices in the future. 49 F.T.C. 1041,
1107 (1953).
versal delivered price systems.7 2 The Commission found that when
used independently 73 these methods did not violate Section 2(a).
The price discrimination charge was dismissed because all buyers
tendered the same actual dollar amount to the seller, although the
seller's net receipts varied greatly.74 All three of the pricing systems
upheld were discriminatory.
In setting prices for welded chain products, respondents used a
single basing point delivered method. The price was determined by
adding to the f.o.b. plant75 price an amount equal to the rail freight
from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to the point of delivery regardless of
the point from which the shipment was actually made. In cases in
which the seller shipped collect, the buyer paid the carrier the freight
from the seller's actual shipping point, not the hypothetical amount
computed on shipment from Pittsburgh. An adjustment was then
made on the invoice for the difference between the actual freight
paid and the Pittsburgh rate included in the price quotation. In
form, all buyers located the same freight-cost distance from Pitts-
burgh paid the same price, but in reality there was no uniformity.76
Despite this discrepancy, the FTC found the basing-point system
nondiscriminatory.
In making sales of tire chains, the respondents in Chain Institute
employed a universal delivered price system. Under this system, tire
70. A single basing point system is one in which delivered prices are computed as though
goods originated at a single point of origin. It consists of the price at that point plus freight
from that point to the destination.
71. A freight equalization system is one in which all points of production are basing
points. The seller charges freight to the buyer on the basis of which production point is nearest
the buyer, regardless of the original shipping location of the goods. The seller absorbs any
differences between the respective freight costs.
72. Under a universal delivered price, the same price, including an average freight cost,
is charged to all destinations in the United States regardless of the seller's actual shipping
costs. For a more detailed discussion of this system and the pricing methods discussed in notes
75, 76 infra, see A. SAWYER, BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 197-212 (1963).
73. The Commission issued a cease and desist order designed to prevent the collusive use
of these pricing systems as a means of unfair competition through price fixing. See note 74
in/ra. The order was interpreted as not preventing the independent use of the pricing forms by
the respondents.
74. 49 F.T.C. 1041, 1104-05 (1953).
75. The shipping term "f.o.b." means free on board and is used to designate the point to
which freight is paid. Thus, "f.o.b. buyer's plant" indicates the seller has paid the freight,
while "f.o.b. seller's plant" means either that the buyer has paid the freight or will transport
the goods himself.
76. For example, assume that it costs a seller $10 to ship to buyers A and B from Pitts-
burgh. At an f.o.b. plant price of $100 Pittsburgh plus, seller's quoted price to either would be
$110. Assume further that the actual freight to both, from a shipping point other than Pitts-
burgh is $4 and that buyer A receives his shipment collect thereby gaining an adjustment for
his out-of-pocket disbursement to the carrier. As effective price would then be $104, the ad-
justment being for $6. If B, on the other hand, is shipped identical goods in the same quantity
but the shipment is not made on a collect basis, his price will remain $110. The difference in
price is plainly discriminatory. The cost justification defense would not be available because it
is used only to justify differentials based on actual cost differences between buyers. In this case
the cost of shipping to each buyer is the same.
chains were sold everywhere in the United States at the same price
regardless of any variations in transportation expenses. Buyers lo-
cated considerable distances from the seller's plant were at a distinct
advantage, because their actual price was lower.77 The seller often
expressly acknowledged this discrimination in cases in which the
buyer paid the carrier for freight charges by making an allowance on
the invoice for the amount of freight paid?8 In other words, actual
costs were deducted from the uniform price that included an average
freight charge. This discrimination was permissible, in the Commis-
sion's view, because the actual dollar amount initially paid to the
seller by each buyer was identical.79
Finally, the respondents in Chain Institute used freight equaliza-
tion prices on sales of weldless chain. The buyer's price was the
seller's f.o.b. plant price plus freight from the nearest freight equali-
zation point, regardless of the origin of the shipment. Discrimina-
tion occurred because buyers located the same freight cost distance
from the point of actual shipment, yet unequal distances from the
freight equalization city, paid different prices despite the seller's uni-
form costs of serving them. ° Again, however, the Commission
failed to find that an obviously discriminatory pricing method vio-
lated Section 2(a).
The FTC's refusal to find fault with the three pricing systems
employed by the Chain Institute respondents was consistent with its
decisions earlier the same year, National Lead Company,8' which up-
held zone delivered prices.8 2 The decision in that case was also de-
77. For instance, actual delivery costs to buyer A might be $10 and to buyer B $5. De-
ducting these costs from a uniform price of $100, A's nondelivered price is $90, while B's is
$95.
78. 49 F.T.C. 1041, 1080 (1953).
79. Id at 1104-05.
80. The seller used four equalization points: York, Pennsylvania; Cleveland and Cincin-
nati, Ohio; and Bridgeport, Connecticut. Assume that buyers A and B are located the same
freight-cost distance from the point of actual shipment but unequal distances from the freight
equalization city. Thus a seller might ship to both A and B from Cleveland at a cost of $10
each, yet charge them from the nearer freight equalization point of Bridgeport at rates of $6
and $8, respectively. Assuming an f.o.b. plant price of $100, A would pay $106 while B would
pay $108. The seller's actual cost of serving both buyers, however, is identical, therefore the
seller could not cost-justify the discrimination. See note 76 supra.
81. 49 F.T.C. 791 (1953), modified, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
352 U.S. 419 (1957).
82. The decision upheld the independent use of uniform zone delivered prices by sellers.
All buyers of the same class within each pricing zone paid the same delivered price, regardless
of their location within the zone. Accordingly, a purchaser located near the factory and one
located hundreds of miles away, yet still within the same zone, pay the same price for items
delivered to their respective plants. The Commission found that, with respect to these buyers,
no violation of Section 2(a) existed. Id at 87 1. The decision in National Lead inferred that
national delivered pricing does not constitute a violation of Section 2(a) since national deliv-
ered pricing is nothing more than a zone system with the zone expanded to include the entire
country. See SAWYER, supra note 72, at 256. This inference was confirmed in Chain Institute,
49 F.T.C. 1041 (1953), which upheld a national delivered price. See notes 77-79 and accompa-
nying text supra.
pendent on the uniformity of the actual dollar amounts paid by each
buyer,83 notwithstanding the discriminatory effects. The United
States Supreme Court upheld the FTC's finding that uniform prices
are not illegal per se.84 Accordingly,85 "a uniform price to two or
more buyers, despite nonuniform costs of serving them, is discrimi-
natory yet legal."86 In light of its endorsement of this discrimination,
the FTC is not in a position to deny the use of backhaul allowances
on the ground that, between backhauling buyers, some would be
paying a lower net price than others. While the discrimination may
be implicit with uniform prices and explicit in backhaul allowances,
it exists in either case. No justification exists, however, for labelling
the identical result illegal in the latter instance while upholding it in
the former.
VI. Public Policy Considerations Supporting Backhaul
Allowances
Strong public policy considerations support the granting of
backhaul allowances. First, allowing discriminatory pricing is not
inherently deleterious to the economy; rather, it promotes competi-
tion.87 Forbidding discriminatory pricing freezes the pricing pattern
and blocks the competitive process by obstructing price adjustments
necessary to respond to changes in supply and demand.88 Compul-
sory one-price policies, therefore, create rigid market structures not
subject to competitive pressures.89 Moreover, by insisting on uni-
form pricing the FTC is creating a high probability of monopoly
formation. In imperfect markets, uniform prices permit near perfect
monopoly since they enable colluding sellers to end competition by
merely matching the uniform price. The uniform price lessens mu-
tual uncertainty because any deviation from the norm can be quickly
identified.9" By denying flexibility to sellers through use of
backhauling allowances in their pricing structures, the Commission
has overlooked one of the basic objectives of the Robinson-Patman
83. 49 F.T.C. 791, 871 (1953).
84. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957). The Court stated, "It is our conclu-
sion that the order does not. . . prohibit or interfere with independent delivered zone pricing
per se. Nor does it prohibit the practice of absorption of actual freight." Id. at 431. Further,
"delivered zone pricing violates the order only when two conditions are present: (I) identical
prices with competitors, (2) resulting from zone delivered pricing." Id at 426.
85. See also Clay Prods. Ass'n., 47 FTC 1256 (1951); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n., Inc., 48
FTC 202 (1951); American Iron & Steel Inst., 48 FTC 123 (1951).
86. HOFFMAN, 2 ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES 580 (Adelman 1951).
87. Id at 578, 586.
88. Id
89. Rowe, Price Dircrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at the Robin.
son-Patman Act, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 972-73 (1951).
90. Id
Act - prevention of monopoly.9 Economic experts agree that the
use of backhaul allowances will foster rather than dampen competi-
tion.92 Furthermore, these beneficial effects will not be limited to
one industry. Any industry in which buyers have the capacity to
backhaul, or who are served by wholesalers that backhaul, will expe-
rience increased competition if backhaul concessions are allowed.93
Second, backhaul allowances should be permitted because the
practice promotes efficiency. In particular, the cost justification de-
fense of Section 2(a) was designed to assure that both buyer and
seller could benefit from gains in efficiency in production and distri-
bution.9 4 Estimates indicate that for one industry alone, removal of
the backhaul allowance prohibition would immediately save 100-250
million dollars in distribution costs per year with the potential for
even greater long-term savings.95
Last, in addition to the monetary savings, backhauling would
save thousands of gallons of gasoline annually.96 In light of the cur-
rent fuel shortage and the expectation of a continued decline, a pol-
icy that encourages energy conservation best serves the national
interest. Given the goals of decreasing wastefulness, increasing effi-
ciency, preventing monopoly, and encouraging competition, public
policy demands the removal of all questions regarding the legality of
backhaul allowances.97
VII. Infeasibility of Alternatives to a Backhaul Allowance for
Actual Costs Saved
Only one method of encouraging the increase in the incidence
of backhauling is acceptable under the Robinson-Patman Act. Sell-
ers must be allowed to grant price reductions to backhauling buyers
for the actual savings in transportation costs. The two alternative
91. See, e.g., the Report of the House Judiciary Committee on the Robinson-Patman
Act:
The purpose of this proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible, equality
of opportunity in business by strengthening antitrust laws and by protecting trade
and commerce against unfair trade practices and unlawful price discrimination and
also against restraint and monopoly. . . [as well as] the protection of the public from
a threat of monopoly or oppression in the production and manufacture of the things
it needs . ..
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1936).
92. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 3, at 29; Letter from John T. Dunlop, Director of the Cost
of Living Council, supra note 56 at I. "The Food Advisory Study clearly shows that the pres-
ent backhaul prohibitions have the . . . effect of lessening competition and substantially re-
ducing economic efficiency". Id
93. See note 60 supra.
94. 80 CONG. REC. 9417 (1936).
95. Letter from John T. Dunlop, supra note 56.
96. PRIVATE LINE, June, 1978, at 1.
97. The FTC can accomplish this by rescinding Advisory Opinion 147. Under the FTC
Rules of Practice, the Commission may at any time reconsider the questions raised by an
advisory opinion and reverse its position if in the public interest. 16 C.F.R. § 1.3(b) (1969).
solutions, an allowance for an average freight charge and a sepa-
rately computed f.o.b. plant price, would result in violations of Sec-
tion 2(a).
A. Deduction ofAverage Freight Charge
The first alternative to achieving an increase in backhauling is
that a deduction be allowed to the backhauling buyer only for the
amount of the seller's average freight cost. This pricing system
avoids any discrimination between backhauling buyers because both
would have the same amount deducted from the delivered price and
would, therefore, continue to pay a uniform price.9" Two problems
arise, however, when an average allowance is used. First, in many
cases the deduction would not be cost-justified. The cost justification
defense of Section 2(a) allows price differentials only in the amount
of the seller's actual cost savings.99 While the deduction need not be
for the full amount of the savings, it may not exceed it. 'I Thus, in
all cases in which backhauling buyers are closer than the average
freight cost distance from the seller a deduction for the average
freight charge would violate Section 2(a) since it would exceed the
amount of the seller's actual savings and, therefore, would not be
cost justified.101
Second, a backhaul allowance for only average costs would pro-
vide no incentive to customers whose cost of backhauling would ex-
ceed the amount of the average freight charge. Nevertheless, many
of these customers can still perform the transportation function at a
cost that is below the seller's actual cost of shipping to them, even if
it exceeds the average charge. 0 2 Backhauling, therefore, should be
encouraged in this situation because it provides for the most efficient
use of the available resources. Accordingly, an average freight cost
allowance is undesirable because it overlooks the goal of economic
efficiency. 103
98. Uniform prices are not assailable under Section 2(a), even if discriminatory. See
note 72 supra.
99. See note 50 supra.
100. See note 47 supra.
101. See, e.g., FTC Advisory Opinion 198, 16 C.F.R. § 15.198 (1968). The manufacturer
requesting the opinion proposed to offer to all buyers purchasing in truckload-lot quantities a
5% discount because of its average freight savings on those orders. The Commission advised
the manufacturer that it could not approve the discount because based on the submitted data it
did "not appear to be uniformly cost-justified" to all customers.
102. A buyer will often be able to perform the transportation function at a lower cost than
the seller since the buyer's trucks are already on the road. Little additional cost is incurred in
making a stop to pick up the goods, even if some rerouting is necessary. The seller, on the
other hand, must pay the full common carrier fee or send his truck on a round trip to the
buyer, generally at a greater expense.
103. See note 94 supra
B. Independently Calculated F 0.B. Plant Price
The alternative to an allowance for actual costs saved proposed
by the FTC would also result in a violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The Commission indicated that rather than giving backhaul al-
lowances sellers could "probably" avoid questions of illegality if
they offered to all customers the option of purchasing at a "true f.o.b.
shipping point price."' 4 By having a separate nondelivered price,
identical for all buyers who accept their goods at the factory, the
seller would avoid the discriminatory effect of granting varying al-
lowances to backhauling buyers.
Standing alone, the FTC solution does not violate 2(a). Subse-
quently, however, the Commission attempted to eliminate the confu-
sion arising from its use of the term "true f.o.b. shipping point
price." The Commission indicated that "no question of unlawful
discrimination would arise so long as the f.o.b. price is uniform and
available to all customers on a nondiscriminatory basis. No legal re-
quirement exists that the alternative fo. b. price be of any particular
amount or computed in any particular way."' 05 This statement, how-
ever, implies that a seller may set the f.o.b. price below that of the
net price paid by buyers accepting full delivery thereby discriminat-
ing against the latter.' °6 Ordinarily, the FTC does not examine net
prices to determine the existence of discrimination. °7 Nevertheless,
in cases in which sales are made to one purchaser on a delivered
basis and to another on an f.o.b. plant basis, a proper comparison
requires that the prices be reduced to a common denominator.'0
The net price is used to determine whether the difference in price to
the two buyers reflects only an allowance for the savings in transpor-
tation costs.'0 9 By implying that the f.o.b. plant price may be com-
puted in any manner, the FTC alternative permits blatant
discrimination." 10 Furthermore, the cost justification defense is un-
available because the differentials are not based on actual costs. I" A
price reduction below the seller's net cost would have no actual cost
justification.
Under either alternative solution, an independent f.o.b. plant
104. FTC Press Release (Dec. 26, 1973).
105. FTC Press Release (Mar. 28, 1975) (emphasis added).
106. For example, since the f.o.b. price need not be "of any particular amount or com-
puted in any particular way," a seller could charge an f.o.b. plant price of $85, while setting his
delivered price, including a freight cost of $10, at $100. In net terms, the delivered price buyer
would pay $90, which is $5 more than the price charged to the f.o.b. buyer.
107. See note 66 supra.
108. Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942 (D. Corn. 1966).
109. Id
110. The FTC view allows a seller to set his f.o.b. plant price below his true net cost,
thereby discriminating against those buyers unable to take delivery at the plant. See, e.g., note
106 supra.
S11. See note 50 supra.
price or an average freight cost deduction, a serious possibility of a
Section 2(a) violation exists. Accordingly, assuming that achieving
the goal of stimulating backhauls is desirable, sellers should be per-
mitted to grant allowances from the uniform delivered price for the
actual amount of freight costs saved.
VIII. Conclusion
The FTC opinion that a system of backhaul allowances from
delivered prices would produce price discrimination in violation of
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is not justified. The Com-
mission has failed to account for the cost justification defense pro-
vided by Section 2(a), the effective availability of backhaul
allowances to all buyers, and its own endorsement of price discrimi-
nation in uniform delivered price systems. The Commission has also
ignored the public policy reasons in favor of backhauling: promoting
efficiency, increasing competition while preventing monopoly, and
conserving energy. The optimal method to encourage backhauling
without violating the Robinson-Patman Act is to allow sellers to
grant price reductions based upon actual cost savings. The FTC
should rescind Advisory Opinion 147 and remove the impediment to
backhauling by eliminating existing doubts about the legality of
backhaul allowances.
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